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The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement resolved the unprecedented litigation in which the states sought
to recoup the cigarette-related Medicaid costs.  The litigation was settled through a combination of
negotiated regulatory requirements and financial payments of about $250 billion over 25 years.  Settlement
payments received by states are strongly related to smoking-related medical costs but are also related
to political factors.  The payments largely took the form of an excise tax equivalent, raising potential
antitrust concerns.  The regulatory restrictions imposed by the agreement also raised antitrust concerns.
However, there has been no evident shift in industry concentration.  The increase in advertising and
marketing expenses has largely taken the form of price discounts.  The settlement sidestepped the
usual procedures pertaining to the imposition of taxes and the promulgation of new regulations.
W. Kip Viscusi
Vanderbilt Law School











  For decades individual lawsuits by smokers against the cigarette industry were 
unsuccessful.  In 1995 state attorneys general launched a series of lawsuits seeking to recoup the 
Medicaid-related costs associated with cigarettes.  The prospects for such lawsuits were not great 
because the same demonstration of wrongful conduct required in individual tort cases would also 
be required for the states’ claims.  In addition, the states were seeking to recoup the value of a 
financial externality, which involves a more novel legal theory than does a standard torts claim.
1  
This litigation was undertaken during a period of increased anti-tobacco sentiment as well as new 
legislation, particularly by states imposing restrictions on locations in which smoking is 
permitted, such as restaurants and hospitals.
2  This changing sentiment in turn would affect juror 
attitudes and the companies’ prospects in court.  
The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that resolved this cigarette litigation was 
innovative in several respects.  First, this settlement marked the end of an unprecedented line of 
litigation in which the state attorneys general sued the tobacco industry for the state Medicaid-
related costs generated by cigarettes.  Second, the nature of the financial settlement also was 
pathbreaking in that it did not involve a damages payment that took a conventional form, but 
instead imposed the equivalent of a per pack cigarette tax that was called a “settlement” 
payment.  Third, the settlement was not restricted to financial compensation as it also imposed 
numerous sweeping regulatory restrictions.  Thus, a tax was imposed without legislative 
approval, and national regulations were enacted without the usual rulemaking process.  The 
                                                 
1 The existence of a financial externality from cigarettes is not a sufficient basis for a valid legal claim as there also 
must be wrongful conduct by the cigarette industry that led to the smoking behavior and the subsequent costs.  
Otherwise, automobile manufacturers and producers of all other risky products would be liable for accident costs 
irrespective of producer negligence or the presence of product defects. 
2 See Hersch, Del Rossi, and Viscusi (2004) and the State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation (STATE) 
System, which can be found online at www2.cdc.gov/nccdphp/osh/state/. 2 
 
absence of such standard political processes has raised a series of questions about the effects of 
the settlement on new entrants, the introduction of new products, and market competition 
generally.  Finally, after decades of successfully defending lawsuits against the tobacco industry, 
this agreement marked the first major litigation-related payoff by the cigarette industry. 
In this paper we analyze the terms of the settlement and its implications.  The stakes 
involved in the settlement were substantial—about $250 billion over the first 25 years.  How this 
money was spent is of policy interest as well in that the stated rationale for the payments was to 
defer the health-related costs of cigarettes and to decrease youth smoking.  The regulatory 
restrictions likewise were targeted at decreasing smoking but may have had anti-competitive 
effects as well.  Thus, the appropriate reference point for judging the settlement is how it 
performed as an unconventional public policy initiative with both regulatory and tax 
components. 
The MSA may have had broader ramifications both for the cigarette industry and tort 
liability.  By imposing a de facto tax and a series of regulatory constraints, the MSA greatly 
expanded the degree of regulation of the cigarette industry.  The 2009 law giving the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) authority to regulate cigarettes can be traced to the attempt by the 
U.S. Congress to legislate a settlement of the state tobacco litigation.  The MSA also influenced 
tort liability generally, both through providing billions of dollars in contingency fees to plaintiff 
attorneys and through an anchoring effect that set litigation damages award targets in the billions 




2. The Master Settlement Agreement
3 
The Master Settlement Agreement of Nov. 23, 1998 marked the end of the tobacco 
litigation launched by the state attorneys general against the cigarette industry.
4  Whether the 
lawsuits would have succeeded was never resolved as no trials were completed in any of the 
cases.  The MSA settled possible claims for 46 states.  Previously, four states—Mississippi, 
Minnesota, Florida, and Texas—reached separate settlements with the tobacco industry.  
Because of the national scope of many of the requirements imposed by the MSA, our main focus 
is on the MSA itself rather than presenting parallel discussions of each feature of the individual 
state settlements. 
2.1 Financial Externalities and the Litigation Focus 
The cases on behalf of the states involved claims for the Medicaid-related costs incurred 
by the states.  Thus, the damages did not pertain to the harms that cigarettes caused to smokers’ 
health but rather focused on the Medicaid costs generated by smoking behavior.  The states’ 
claims consequently focused on the gross cigarette costs to the states from one program, 
Medicaid, rather than on the net costs across all programs.  Estimates in Viscusi (1995, 2002a) 
found that on balance cigarettes did not impose net financial costs, but rather yielded net cost 
savings.
5   
The first state to file a financial claim against the cigarette companies for smoking-related 
Medicaid costs was Mississippi in 1995.  Even though the cigarette industry had never advocated 
the net financial cost approach, nevertheless, Mississippi’s opening salvo in the cigarette 
                                                 
3 For previous treatments of the MSA and regulation through litigation generally, see Bulow and Klemperer (1998), 
Wagner (1999), Viscusi (2002a, b), and Cutler et al. (2002).  
4 Because of the political sensitivity of the settlement, some states did not sign on to the agreement until after the 
November 1998 elections.  One such example is Massachusetts, where anti-tobacco groups lobbied for more 
punitive settlement terms. 
5 The national net financial costs per pack in 1995 dollars at a 3% interest rate were $0.58 total medical care, $0.01 
sick leave, $0.14 life insurance, -$0.24 nursing home care, -$1.26 retirement and pension, $0.02 fires, and $0.43 
taxes on earnings, for a net cost of -$0.32. 4 
 
litigation was its Memorandum that explicitly targeted the net financial cost reasoning in the 
NBER working paper version of Viscusi (1995):  
A credit to the cigarette industry for any monetary savings in elderly health care, as well 
as other savings resulting in the premature deaths of smokers, is utterly repugnant to a 
civilized society and must be rejected on grounds of public policy….The contention of 
entitlement to an ‘elderly death’ credit is, on its face, void as against public policy.  That 
policy and basic human decency preclude the defendants from putting forth the perverse 
and depraved argument that by killing Mississippians prematurely, they provide an 
economic benefit to the State.  No court of equity should countenance, condone, or 
sanction such base, evil, and corrupt arguments….The defendants’ argument is indeed 
ghoulish.  They are merchants of death.  Seeking a credit for a purported economic 
benefit for early death is akin to robbing the graves of Mississippi smokers who died 
from tobacco-related illnesses.  No court of law or equity should entertain such a defense 
or counterclaim.  It is offensive to human decency, an affront to justice, uncharacteristic 
of civilized society, and unquestionably contrary to public policy.
6   
 
What is particularly noteworthy is that Mississippi’s Memorandum was the opening salvo 
in the tobacco litigation before the defendants had put forth any arguments.
7  But it was clear to 
the states that by framing the litigation in terms of the gross financial costs associated with 
Medicaid, the states could enhance their prospective payoff.
8  All states adopted a similar 
approach although there were some differences in the calculations of the damages payments 
owed to the states.  
The MSA settled this litigation, putting an end to the claims on behalf of the states.  Not 
all states had filed claims.  For example, the state of Alabama opposed the litigation and never 
                                                 
6 See Viscusi (2002a) p. 87.  Memorandum in Support of the State’s Motion for Ruling in Limine, or Alternatively, 
for Partial Summary Judgment, in re Moore, Attorney General ex Rel., State of Mississippi Tobacco Litigation, 
Cause No. 94-1429, (August 11, 1995), pp. 3, 21, and 23.  The Viscusi (1995) NBER study received no financial 
support from the tobacco industry, which was not aware of the study.  To the best of Viscusi’s knowledge, the study 
has never been presented in testimony on behalf of the tobacco industry. 
7 For the state of Mississippi, which was the state that launched the litigation, the financial externalities from 
cigarettes were $0.02 medical care, -$0.03 nursing homes, -$0.05 pensions, $0.02 taxes on earnings, for a net 
financial externality of -$0.04.  In addition, the Mississippi state cigarette excise tax was $0.18.  See Viscusi (1999, 
2002a). 
8 The states also included the Federal share of Medicaid costs in the claim as well as other costs that the states did 
not actually incur.  See Viscusi (2002a). 5 
 
filed a claim against the tobacco industry, but nevertheless participated in the MSA.
9  The MSA 
had no direct effect on individual lawsuits, class action lawsuits, and punitive damages.  These 
efforts were not restricted by the MSA despite attempts by the cigarette industry to obtain 
protections in these areas.  In 1997 and 1998 there were legislative attempts by the U.S. 
Congress to settle the litigation at the national level through the imposition of cigarette tax 
payments and regulatory reforms.  In this proposed legislation, which was referred to as the 
Proposed Resolution, the cigarette industry had sought protections against punitive damages and 
class actions.  No legislation was enacted because Congress’s late drafts of the Proposed 
Resolution omitted such protections and escalated the tax payments.  The tobacco industry 
withdrew its participation, decreasing support for the legislation in Congress.  The benefits 
reaped by the states from the MSA included a variety of regulatory restrictions and financial 
payments.  
2.2 Financial Characteristics of the Settlement 
The first distinctive aspect of the MSA is that this settlement of the litigation did not 
involve settlement payments of the usual type.  Financial settlements typically involve either 
lump sum payments or structured payments to the claimant, where in each instance the payments 
are being made by the defendant.  For the MSA some of the minor costs, such as the costs of the 
MSA executive committee and enforcement costs, were borne directly by the companies, but the 
primary thrust of the settlement terms was to impose the equivalent of an additional excise tax on 
                                                 
9 The reasoning for the state of Alabama was articulated by then Deputy Attorney General and now Federal Judge 
William Pryor: “We recommend to the Governor and the Attorney General that the State of Alabama not file a 
Medicaid reimbursement suit.  We do not believe that filing such a suit would serve the interests of the citizens of 
Alabama.  First, such a suit would advance weak legal or equitable theories which, even if the State won the suit, 
would threaten to undermine Alabama law generally.  Second, the State’s burden of proving net harm is 
problematic, because widely respected economic studies conclude that there is no net harm to the State’s treasury as 
a result of cigarette consumption.  Third, this litigation would effectively raise taxes on tobacco companies without 
going through the ordinary legislative process.  As a matter of judicial and political economy, if the State of 
Alabama wants to raise taxes on tobacco, the Legislature, not the judiciary, should do so.” See Viscusi (2002a) p. 
48. 6 
 
cigarettes for which payments would go to the states.  In effect, the states used the MSA to 
impose additional cigarette taxes rather than obtaining the authorization of state legislatures.  
Specifically, the MSA imposed fees in perpetuity based on cigarette sales so that the fees are 
tantamount to an excise tax.  The preferences of the citizenry in the affected states were not 
reflected in the same manner as they might have been if legislation were required.  The decision 
to participate in the MSA and the terms of the participation were the result of a series of bargains 
involving representatives of the affected companies and the states, with a small group of 
attorneys general playing a pivotal role.
10  The imposition of a tax equivalent through litigation 
rather than legislation involved efficiency costs as well as the possible issue of appropriateness 
of bypassing the usual legislative processes.  Moreover, this type of intervention is asymmetric 
as such deals can boost tax rates but not decrease them.   
The settlement did not emerge in the abstract but took shape only after the efforts in 1997 
and 1998 to pass the Proposed Resolution were unsuccessful.  At the time of that legislation’s 
demise, the cigarette industry favored greater protections against other forms of litigation than 
would be provided by the subsequent MSA, while anti-tobacco advocates favored higher tax 
rates and more regulation than the MSA would ultimately impose. 
One lesson from the Proposed Resolution experience was that indications that there 
would be a settled resolution of the state cases led to favorable stock price effects for the 
cigarette companies.  The market expectations, and presumably the expectations of the 
companies as well, was that settling the state cases would eliminate the litigation threat as the 
companies had an unblemished record of success in individual smoker cases.  While this may 
have been a reasonable expectation at that time, after the fact it proved to be quite wrong.  If 
                                                 
10None of the state legislatures were involved in ratifying the agreements, and at least in some instances, notably 
Massachusetts, the actions of the state attorney general conflicted with the views of the governor. 7 
 
company executives were in fact cognizant of the adverse longer term implications of the MSA 
but nevertheless favored the MSA to reap short term benefits, that would reflect a possible 
agency problem. 
Settlement in the form of a tax equivalent rather than a lump sum payment has two 
principal economic ramifications.  First, taxes raise the price of the product, discouraging 
smoking behavior through the incentive effect.  Second, because of the finite financial resources 
of the affected firms, the total present value of the payments to the states could be larger if the 
damages were paid in the form of a unit tax rather than a lump sum penalty.  Some anti-smoking 
advocates had favored a lump sum damages payment to maximize the immediate harm to the 
industry, while others placed greater weight on the objectives of discouraging smoking behavior 
and maximizing the state’s financial gain.  The choice of the form of the payment influences the 
extent to which each of these objectives can be fostered as there is an inevitable tradeoff 
involved in the choice of the payment structure. 
In a standard tort claim, the damages bear a direct relation to the harm.  Because the basis 
of the suits was recovery of Medicaid costs, a natural question to ask is what relationship does a 
cigarette tax have to the state’s financial costs attributable to the wrongful conduct of the 
companies?  The trigger for the payment of any damages is the alleged wrongful conduct by the 
companies, such as that relating to claims of deceptive advertising and concealment of the 
product risks.
11  However, if this behavior was in the past and will not continue into the 
indefinite future, as will the per unit tax equivalent feature of the MSA, then the penalty being 
levied is not directly related to the alleged wrongful conduct or even the time period in which the 
wrongful conduct is alleged to have occurred.  Similarly, if all major manufacturers are not 
                                                 
11 The states’ damages claims assumed that all Medicaid-related costs of cigarettes were attributable to the 
industry’s wrongful conduct.  However, it is unreasonable to assume that smoking rates would be zero in the 
absence of possible wrong conduct.  8 
 
guilty of the same wrongful conduct, then the imposition of penalties on all firms may not be 
warranted from the standpoint of setting prices at an efficient level.  For prices to be efficient, 
they should reflect the marginal costs associated with the product.  Penalties related to past 
harmful conduct that is no longer occurring are not well suited to establishing efficient prices for 
currently produced products.  In a competitive market situation, such costs linked to past 
behavior are fixed costs and cannot be embedded successfully in the product price.   
The pivotal economic actors consist of parties that are not subject to these damages 
payments.  The extreme case is that of potential new entrants that did not exist during the period 
of wrongful conduct.  Nevertheless, the MSA is structured so that new entrants will share in a 
variant of the penalty structure to be discussed below.  The MSA did not provide for a damages 
payment in any real sense but rather imposed a disguised form of cigarette tax.  Likewise, the 
total amounts of the tax were not driven solely by the damages in the cases, but emerged from 
the bargaining power of the respective parties, which included the major cigarette producers but 
not potential new entrants.  Even if a new entrant were to market a completely safe cigarette, it 
would still have to pay the MSA fee.  The same types of political factors also influenced the 
relative payment shares for each of the states, as will be discussed below. 
The financial stakes in the tobacco litigation settlements were quite substantial.  In 1997 
and earlier in 1998 before the MSA was finalized, four states reached separate agreements with 
the cigarette industry: $3.6 billion for Mississippi, $11.3 billion for Florida, $15.3 billion for 
Texas, and $6.6 billion for Minnesota, for a total of $36.8 billion.  These four states had made 
the most progress in developing their cases.
12  In addition to the $36.8 billion in settlements for 
                                                 
12 The first state to file a lawsuit was Mississippi.  The trial was about to begin in Mississippi at the time of the 
settlement.  The amount of the settlement exceeded the damages sought in the case, much to the surprise of the 
defense attorneys litigating the case.  The first of the state tobacco trials took place in Minnesota, but the settlement 9 
 
these four states, there was the MSA settlement in the remaining states for $206 billion.  The 
combined undiscounted total of payments to all 50 states over the first 25 years is $243 million.  
There were also about $7 billion in additional payments, including payments for a foundation 
and anti-smoking education as well as enforcement, making the total of all settlements about 
$250 billion. 
While some of the payments were initial payments made in the first five years of the 
agreement, the bulk of the payments consisted of annual payments.  The annual payment levels 
were set so that for the $8 billion payment amount from 2004 to 2007, the MSA agreement 
would impose a tax-equivalent charge of $0.33 per pack.  Combined with the four separate state 
settlements, the total tax equivalent is $0.40 per pack.   
Payments will decline if cigarette sales decline, so the agreement does function 
effectively as a tax.  New entrants were required to pay these amounts into a fund even if they 
had never sold any cigarettes before 1998 and thus could not even be affected by the type of 
litigation that the MSA was settling.  To participate in the settlement revenues, states were 
required to adopt “Qualifying Statutes.”  These statutes required new entrants to pay a pro rate 
damages amount based on their cigarette sales, where these per pack levies are the same as for 
cigarettes sold by the defendants in the state litigation.  For these companies, there was no 
previous wrongful conduct or previous cigarette market conduct of any sort.  In this way the 
MSA provided a competitive shield so that firms that were not parties to the litigation could not 
have a cost advantage.
13   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
occurred before the trial was concluded.  Texas and Florida had completed most of the depositions of experts before 
the settlement. 
13 Potentially these new entrants could obtain reimbursement for these payments 25 years later if they could 
demonstrate that there was no wrongful conduct throughout the period.  At least one new entrant, the South African 
firm Carolina Tobacco Company, claimed that the payments to the states threatened the firm’s profitability. 10 
 
2.3 The Political Economy of the Settlement Amounts 
How the settlement funds would be divided among the 46 MSA participants was 
determined by a political bargain, the results of which are summarized in Table 1.
14  The first 
column of statistics is a calculation of the percentage share of the state’s medical costs calculated 
by Viscusi (1999, 2002a).  These costs are calculated using state-specific information on 
smoking rates and medical cost structures including the state’s Medicaid expenses, state 
expenditures on community hospitals, and other state medical costs.  The sum of all states’ 
expenses comprise the national medical costs that are being addressed by the MSA, where these 
calculations follow the states’ procedures of assuming that the defense is liable for all such 
smoking-related costs.
15  Thus, the denominator in the calculation is the total U.S. smoking-
attributable state health costs, while the numerator is the state-specific value.  These estimates 
are the actual economic costs calculated using the same procedure for each state and are not 
identical to the diverse approaches used by the handful of states that undertook such calculations 
at the time of the settlement.
16  With the exception of the states’ calculation of the medical costs 
for Massachusetts, the states’ calculations of the medical costs generally included the federal 
costs share as well as the state share, and also did not account for the net incremental costs of 
smoking behavior.
17  All economic estimates reported here follow the practice in the economics 
literature of isolating the net incremental costs incurred by the states where the reference point is 
the nonsmoking smoker.  While the financial externalities of smoking are not great and on 
                                                 
14 The procedures used for calculating the state-specific costs reported in Table 1 are calculated by Viscusi (1999) 
using his economic cost calculation procedure, not that of the states. 
15 If states had differed in whether the alleged wrongful conduct contributed to the costs, then the percentage of 
recoverable medical costs would need to be adjusted. 
16 A critique of the state cost calculations appears in Viscusi (2002a), which shows that the states’ calculations 
greatly overstated their smoking-related medical costs.  The states’ calculations also did not isolate the share of the 
costs attributable to wrongful conduct but rather included all costs. 
17 Cutler et al. (2000) present the estimates for the state of Massachusetts, where these calculations are consistent 
with sound economic principles. 11 
 
balance are favorable, the health cost internalities are more substantial (Viscusi and Hersch 
2008), but these were not the subject of the litigation. 
The second column of statistics in Table 1 presents the percentage share of the settlement 
received by the different states.  Interestingly, New York received a 12.995 percent share that is 
almost identical to that of California’s 12.997 percent share, even though New York accounted 
for 15.17 percent of the national smoking-related Medicaid costs as compared to 8.551 percent 
for California.  This disparity highlights the political influences on the MSA.   
The best measure of how the states fared is represented by the statistics in the final 
column of Table 1, which divides the payment share by the medical cost share.  States with a 
value above 1 reaped a disproportionate share of the settlement.  The state of Washington, which 
was represented by the lead MSA broker Christine Gregoire, then attorney general and 
subsequently governor, received a relatively high ratio of 1.396.  The most prominent tobacco 
states fared particularly poorly, as North Carolina, Virginia, and Kentucky all had ratios in the 
0.6 to 0.8 range.  The state of Iowa, where the state’s tobacco case had been dismissed, 
nevertheless had a ratio of 0.901, and the state of Alabama, where the state attorney general 
refused to file a case because he did not believe such cases had validity, had a ratio of 1.08.  
Factors other than the state’s expected damages amounts in the litigation clearly influenced the 
distribution of the payments. 
Using this sample of 46 states, we estimate the determinants of the percentage share of 
the settlement.  The key variable included in the regression is the state share of the medical costs, 
which should fully account for the division of the payments if the payments are distributed based 
on the rationale for the claims.  As a proxy for anti-tobacco political sentiments and political 
pressures to secure revenues from cigarettes, we include the per pack cigarette excise tax that 12 
 
prevailed in the state in 1998.
18  One would expect that states with a stronger anti-smoking 
sentiment would be more aggressive in waging the litigation with respect to the Medicaid claims 
and in obtaining a larger share of the MSA.  We also include a dummy variable for whether the 
state had a Republican governor in 1998.  The regression results reported in the first column of 
Table 2 indicate that the settlement share is strongly related to the medical cost share, but on less 
than a one-to-one basis.  States with a higher cigarette excise tax fared better in terms of the 
settlement share, but the political party of the governor did not have a statistically significant 
effect.
19 
The regression in the second column of Table 2 reframes the issue in terms of the state’s 
relative gain from the settlement, or the settlement share minus the share of medical costs 
divided by the medical cost share.
20  As expected based on the previous results, states with 
higher cigarette tax rates reaped a greater relative gain from the settlement based on what they 
should have received given their state-specific smoking-related medical costs. 
Because the details of the MSA negotiations were not made public, one can only 
speculate as to the source of the positive influence of the state excise tax variable.  One 
prominent possibility is that the strong anti-tobacco states required more compensation to sign 
onto the agreement.  A second possibility is that the negotiations were not based on actual 
medical expenditures reflecting state-specific differences in smoking rates.  Smoking rates are 
lower in states with higher excise taxes so that population-based compensation levels will 
overcompensate the high excise tax states. 
                                                 
18 These data are from Orzechowski and Walker (2008). 
19 In exploratory regressions we examined other possible determinants of the state settlement share, such as whether 
the state is a major tobacco producer.  However, most of these tobacco-related political factors are already reflected 
in the state’s cigarette excise tax rate.  For example, the major tobacco producing states of North Carolina, Virginia, 
and Kentucky have very low cigarette excise taxes.   
20 Thus, the dependent variable is the data in the third column on Table 1 minus 1.  13 
 
2.4 Regulatory Components of the MSA 
In addition to the financial structure that generates payments to the states, the MSA 
included additional regulatory provisions as well.  As with taxes, the MSA could only increase 
regulatory restrictions and not decrease them.  The MSA banned the targeting of youths in 
advertising and cigarette marketing, which led to subsequent debate over which publications 
were youth oriented and which were not.
21  Youths were no longer permitted to have access to 
free samples of cigarettes.  In that same spirit, the MSA also banned the use of cartoons in 
advertising, such as the penguin that appeared in the Kool ads and Joe Camel in the Camel ads.  
A year before the MSA, R.J. Reynolds had voluntarily retired Joe Camel, who was the most 
prominent cigarette cartoon character.
22  The MSA also banned outdoor advertising and cigarette 
advertisements, tobacco name brand merchandise, and payments for product placements in 
movies and television shows.  The MSA imposed limits but not a ban on corporate sponsorship 
of events.  The agreement also disbanded the two main trade associations, the Tobacco Institute 
and the Council for Tobacco Research, and prohibited the companies from lobbying against 
policies attempting to reduce youth smoking. 
The various restrictions on advertising and marketing raise two classes of possible 
concerns: the effect on market concentration, and the effect on the introduction of new types of 
cigarettes, such as those that are less hazardous to health.   
A final noteworthy component of the settlements with the states involved the release of 
tobacco industry documents.  As part of the settlement with the state of Minnesota, the tobacco 
industry documents obtained during the course of the litigation were posted online and made 
                                                 
21 R.J. Reynolds in particular became embroiled in a controversy over the target age group for Rolling Stone 
magazine. 
22 The role of Joe Camel with respect to youth smoking had been the subject of an FTC case that the agency 
dropped.  Joe Camel retired just before his tenth birthday. 14 
 
available for future private suits and class actions against the industry (see 
www.tobaccodocuments.org).  This measure consequently reduced the litigation costs that 
plaintiffs in future cases would have to bear by making the results of the discovery process in 
this case a public good. 
  
3. The Levels and Allocation of the State Payments 
3.1 Payments and Their Role in State Budgets 
The MSA provided for a series of upfront payments ranging from $2.4 billion to $2.7 
billion per year from 1998–2003.  The annual payments continuing into perpetuity were $4.5 
billion in 2000, $5 billion in 2001, and $6.5 billion in 2002 and 2003.
23  Including the four states 
that settled separately, the states received $8.0 billion in payments in 2003 and a total of $37.5 
billion from 2000 to 2003 (McKinley et al. 2003, 3).  
While the proceeds from the MSA are substantial, they do not constitute a major part of 
states’ budgets.  Table 3 provides a breakdown by state of the MSA payments and the share these 
payments have of the total tax revenues for each state in 2003.  For comparison, Table 3 also 
presents comparable statistics for cigarette taxes.  With the exception of Mississippi, the MSA 
payments, while substantial, constitute under 1% of the states’ total revenues.  Because the MSA 
payments are comparable to a $0.40 per pack tax, the MSA revenues are sometimes less than the 
revenues from cigarette taxes.   
Although the MSA provides for payments to the states that will continue indefinitely, 
some states obtained much of the future value of the funds by securitizing part of their share of 
the MSA payments.  The principal impetus for these efforts is that many states faced budget 
deficits so that cashing in on future payments might shortchange future residents but had the 
                                                 
23 These payments would continue to increase over time until reaching $9.0 billion annually in 2018. 15 
 
advantage of providing immediate political benefits.  From fiscal year 2000–2005, total MSA-
related payments to the 46 states were $52.6 billion, of which $36.5 billion were annual MSA 
payments and $16.0 billion were securitized proceeds (U.S. Government Accountability Office 
2007). 
Table 4 lists the securitized proceeds received by the states in fiscal years 2000–2005.  
The states with the largest securitized proceeds for fiscal years 2000–2005 are New York with 
$4.2 billion, New Jersey with $2.8 billion, California with $2.5 billion, and Louisiana with $1.1 
billion.  Some states have had multiple bond issues as they have securitized greater portions of 
their payments over time.  Regression estimates show that the amounts securitized by the states 
are positively related to the state’s share of the MSA payments.
24  State fiscal crises also have 
affected whether the state securitized (Sloan et al. 2005).   
The value of the bond issues hinged on the ability of the cigarette companies to continue 
to make their MSA payments.  Litigation that led to court awards that threatened the viability of 
the industry consequently reduced the value of the bonds so that the MSA led to an alignment of 
the interests of the cigarette industry and the states.  After the $10.2 billion verdict in the Illinois 
class action cigarette case, Price v. Philip Morris Inc., Philip Morris was required to post a $12 
billion bond if it wished to appeal the case.  Because this amount threatened the company’s 
ability to pay its April 2003 MSA payments to the states, the value of the MSA tobacco bonds 
dropped by 20% (McKinley et al. 2003, 26).  Because of this threat to the solvency of Philip 
Morris, the prospects for securitization dimmed.  California cancelled the sale of its bonds, and 
New York proceeded with its $4.2 billion sale only after pledging to make up any shortfall in the 
tobacco companies’ payments with the state’s general revenue funds (McKinley et al. 2003, 18).  
                                                 
24 Specifically, a Tobit regression yields the following coefficient estimates, with standard errors reported in 
parentheses: Amount securitized (in $ millions) = -1584 (500) + 268 (73) Share of settlement + 1236 (814) Cigarette 
excise tax in 1999. 16 
 
Although the Illinois Supreme Court subsequently overturned the verdict in the Price case in 
2006, this incident highlights the continued financial stake that the states have in the financial 
well-being of the cigarette industry. 
3.2 How the Payments Were Spent 
The allocation of the payments by the states bore little relation to the avowed objective of 
decreasing tobacco smoking, particularly among underage smokers.  Table 5 summarizes the 
spending distribution of both the payments and the securitized proceeds.  Note that these 
allocations are gross allocations, not net, so they may not necessarily indicate an increase in state 
spending in particular areas.  Almost one-third of the funds were designated for health programs.  
While Medicaid is included among the targeted efforts, other funded programs included cancer 
prevention programs generally, drug addiction programs, the provision of adult health insurance, 
medical assistance for the disabled, and pharmaceutical assistance for the elderly (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2007, pp. 8-9).  As Table 5 indicates, most of the funds were 
for deficit reduction, unallocated general revenues, general purposes, and other categories 
unrelated to smoking and health.  Many states had quite targeted allocations, as Tennessee 
allocated all the funds to general revenues to balance the budget, and Kentucky allocated 50% of 
the funds for economic assistance to tobacco farmers (McKinley et al. 2003, pp. 37, 59).  
Tobacco control efforts received only 3.5% of the funds, and this categorization is sufficiently 
broad that it overstates the amount actually targeted at anti-smoking efforts.
25  Gross et al. (2002) 
found that in 2001, the per capita level of spending targeted at tobacco control efforts was 
negatively related to the percentage of smokers in the state and to whether the state was a 
                                                 
25 The relatively ambitious efforts by the state of Illinois in FY 2004 included “$1 million for the American Lung 
Association, $2.3 million for school-based health clinics, $5 million for grants to local health departments, $1.2 
million to the Liquor Control commission for age enforcement, $0.5 million for MSA enforcement, $1 million for 
tobacco control research, and $5 million for tobacco-use prevention” (McKinley et al. 2003, 34). 17 
 
tobacco-producing state.
26  Similarly, Sloan et al. (2005) found that the per capita settlement 
funds allocated to tobacco control followed expected patterns with tobacco control expenditures 
negatively related to tobacco production and positively related to medical lobbies.  With rare 
exceptions, the funds obtained from securitization were targeted to deficit reduction, economic 
development, education, capital projects, and other matters unrelated to smoking or health.  
Louisiana and South Carolina included health care among the purposes of the securitized funds 
(Johnson 2004). 
As a result, anti-smoking groups have expressed dissatisfaction with how the funds have 
been allocated.  Irrespective of state differences, the levels of expenditure for tobacco control are 
low.  The Centers for Disease Control established funding guidelines for tobacco-use prevention 
that few states have been able to meet.  In 2000 the only state that met the guidelines was 
Mississippi, which was not part of the MSA.  The three states that met the guidelines in 
subsequent years were Hawaii, Indiana, and Maine in 2001; Maine, Massachusetts, and 
Mississippi in 2002; and Arkansas, Maine, and Mississippi in 2003.  With the exception of 
Maine and Mississippi, there are no repeat players in meeting the minimum guidelines 
established by the CDC.  The MSA funds have proven to be quite fungible, bearing little relation 
to the intended purpose of the funds. 
 
4. The Effects of Advertising Restrictions 
A particularly visible consequence of the MSA is that it bolstered the already stringent 
restrictions on the advertising and marketing of cigarettes.  Table 6 reports the different 
                                                 
26 Over the 1981–2000 time period that includes many years before the MSA, expenditures on tobacco control 
efforts have been found to reduce per capita cigarette sales.  See Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2003).  Marlow 
(2007) found that California’s tobacco control expenditures accounted for much of the decline in that state’s per 
capita cigarette sales since 1988.  18 
 
expenditure categories from MSA year of 1998 and the most recent year for which data are 
available, 2005, based on data compiled by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2007).  All data 
have been converted to $2005.  The “Total” figures at the bottom of Table 6 indicate an overall 
rise in advertising and marketing expenditures from 1998 to 2005.  This jump in total advertising 
and marketing expenditures is frequently cited in the literature, in the press, and by the U.S. 
Congress as evidence that the MSA failed to influence advertising expenditures for cigarettes.  
However, advertising and marketing tallies that also include price discounts from the much 
higher post-MSA cigarette prices are a quite misleading measure of the temporal shifts.  By far 
the three largest component categories in Table 6 involve pricing effects rather than advertising.  
The largest component are promotional allowances and price discounts, which rose from $3.4 
billion in 1998 to $10.6 billion in 2005.  If these discounts had been at the wholesale level rather 
than the retail level, they would not have appeared in the advertising and marketing expenditure 
tally.  The second largest category in 2005 is coupons, which likewise represent a form of price 
discount.  The third price-related component is the retail-value-added category.  Almost all of the 
retail-value-added component, or 99% in 2005, is from offers such as buy one pack, get one pack 
free.  The remainder involves bonus items such as a T-shirt given away when the customer 
purchases three packs of cigarettes.  Together the three price-related marketing practices involve 
total expenditures in 2005 of $12.2 billion, which is 93% of all advertising and marketing 
expenditures.  In contrast, in 1998 these categories accounted for 76% of all expenditures, as the 
advertising components had a larger share. 
The net effects over the 1998–2005 period involve substantial declines in the advertising 
components, with the exception of the modest internet marketing that increased and sampling 19 
 
distributions which were quite stable.  Advertising in newspapers, magazines, outdoor ads, and 
transit ads plummeted.   
The three largest advertising categories in 2005 were specialty item distribution, public 
entertainment, and point-of-sale advertising, each of which accounted for about $200 million in 
expenditures.  The overwhelming share of specialty items distributed were non-branded items 
such as lighters and sporting goods distributed with cigarettes.  Sponsorships of events in adults-
only facilities such as a bar night and sponsorships of general-audience entertainment such as 
fishing tournaments comprise the public entertainment category.  Point-of-sale advertising 
declined post-MSA.  This advertising consists of ads posted at the retail location, not including 
outdoor ads posted on the property.   
Table 7 reports the regression coefficient (standard error) from a regression of the 
expenditure category against a simple time trend variable and a 0-1 dummy variable for the post-
MSA period.  In most instances, data used for the regressions are available annually from 1975–
2005 so that there are 31 observations per expenditure category.  There are two matters of 
interest – whether there has been a general time trend in the spending category, and whether 
there has been a post-MSA shift in the level of spending. 
As shown in Table 7, promotional allowances and price discounts have been rising by 
$163 million annually, with an additional jump of $4.8 billion in the post-MSA period.  There is 
no temporal trend in the retail-value-added component, but there is an increase of $1.9 billion 
after the MSA. 
The restrictions imposed by the MSA on marketing and advertising led to statistically 
significant post-MSA declines for outdoor advertising, transit advertising, point-of-sale displays, 20 
 
and specialty item distribution.  For total advertising and marketing expenditures, there has been 
an annual temporal increase of $186 million coupled with a post-MSA rise of $6.0 billion.  
Coupled with the increase in product prices due to the MSA and subsequent state 
cigarette tax increases, the advertising restrictions led to a substantial shift in the marketing 
efforts for cigarettes.  Constrained forms of marketing and advertising declined, while 
unconstrained forms often increased.  Chief among these marketing efforts is the use of price 
discounts, which by their very nature are targeted to legal purchasers of cigarettes and are also 
responsive to the demand effects arising from the increased cost of cigarettes.   
Reduced yield cigarettes such as Eclipse have not made major inroads in the market.  
Consumers have continued to shift into the “light” cigarette segment, but the very low tar yield 
cigarette share has declined.  From 1998 to 2005 the market share of cigarettes with 12 mg. or 
less of tar rose from 56.8% to 58.4%, but there was a decline from 22.9% to 18.7% for the 9 mg. 
or less category, from 13.2% to 11.5% for the 6 mg. or less category, and from 1.6% to 0.6% for 
the 3 mg. or less category (U.S. Federal Trade Commission 2007, Table 4A).  Increases in 




In addition to the aforementioned effects of advertising on introducing new lower risk 
products, there might also be effects of advertising restrictions on market structure.  To the 
extent that the MSA restrained market competition, one might expect there to be a rise in market 
concentration.  Such an increase may boost price-cost margins and diminish the consumer 
                                                 
27 Data discussed in this section are drawn from the Maxwell Consumer Report, March 16, 1999, and the Maxwell 
Report dated March 9, 2000; March 3, 2001; February, 2002; March, 2003; February, 2004; and February, 2006.  
These are the year end and fourth quarter sales estimates for the cigarette industry in the respective preceding years.  
Reports include data for multiple years. 21 
 
surplus received by purchasers of cigarettes.  An alternative hypothesis is that market 
concentration will not be affected, but that advertising limitations will freeze market shares.  
That there might be anti-competitive effects of the advertising restrictions is a concern that was 
raised after the fact by some economists, though it was not a prominent part of the policy 
debate.
28  It is noteworthy that a classic textbook case of where industry collusion would be 
desirable is with respect to advertising expenditures, which tend to have a Prisoners’ Dilemma 
type of structure (Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon 2005, p. 102).  While industry collusion to 
restrict advertising is illegal, collusion can be accomplished legally through a mechanism such as 
the MSA in which the restrictions are instituted under the guise of decreasing smoking rather 
than reducing advertising costs to the industry.  Whether the MSA was in fact a form of collusion 
is less important than whether it led to the anti-competitive effects associated with collusion. 
The data reported in Table 8 suggest that the most extreme fears of the effects of the 
advertising restrictions were not well founded.  Table 8 summarizes the market shares for the 
major tobacco companies from 1997 through 2005.  Philip Morris, the clear market leader, had a 
48-51% market share throughout the period and a 49% share both in 1998 and 2005.  Lorillard 
likewise maintained a 9-10% share throughout this period, and Liggett remained an insignificant 
player in the market in the 1-3% range.   
This considerable stability is not shared by the performance of the other firms.  R.J. 
Reynolds experienced a modest decline in market share from 24% in 1998 to 22% in 2005, but 
the company with which it merged, Brown & Williamson, dropped from a 15% market share in 
1998 to 11% in 2003.  The two growth categories were the “Others” grouping of generic 
cigarettes and Commonwealth Brands, which marketed six discount brands that it purchased 
                                                 
28 Discussion of the possible anti-competitive effects appears in Viscusi (2002a) and in the Expert Report of Joseph 
E. Stiglitz (2005) in Schwab et al. v. Philip Morris, Civil Action No. 04-1945. U.S. District Court, Eastern District 
of New York. 22 
 
from Brown & Williamson.
29  The merger of two companies and the spinoff of the discount 
brands complicated assessments of the MSA on market competition.  Consistent with the 
hypothesis that the MSA locked in market shares is that the market shares of Philip Morris and 
Lorillard have remained virtually unchanged since the MSA.  Such patterns could, of course, 
reflect market stability rather than anti-competitive effects.  The ultimate effects on market 
competition will be manifested over the longer term.  
The effects on market concentration likewise are modest.  The bottom row of Table 8 
reports the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) values based on the cigarette industry categories 
shown in the table.
30  While the HHI values are relatively high, which would certainly be 
expected given that a single firm accounts for half the market, there is no evidence of an anti-
competitive increase in concentration based on the change in the HHI.  The HHI index in 1998 is 
3327, which is a bit larger than the 2003 pre-merger value of 3222.  After the R.J. Reynolds-
Brown & Williamson merger, the HHI index rises modestly to 3271 and continues to increase to 
3336 in 2005.   
An additional instructive reference point is to ask what the pattern of HHI index values 
would have been if R.J. Reynolds and Brown & Williamson were treated as a single entity 
throughout the 1997–2005 period.  If that industry structure had prevailed, the HHI index would 




                                                 
29 The brands were Tuscany, which Commonwealth Brands calls its “premium” brand, and the generic brands USA 
Gold, Montclair, Malibu, Sonoma, and Riviera. 
30 The HHI index is defined as follows.  Letting si represent the fraction of industry sales by firm i, then HHI = 
(100s1)
2 + (100s2)
2 + … + (100sn)
2, where there are n firms in the industry.  For purposes of our calculations, we 
treat sales by “Others” as being sales by a single firm.  23 
 
6. Legal Fees and Subsequent Litigation 
The MSA had four principal ramifications for subsequent litigation against the cigarette 
industry.  First, because the attorneys representing the states received billions of dollars in 
payments associated with the settlement, the financial resources of the plaintiffs’ bar were 
enhanced, thus providing potential financial backing for additional litigation.  Second, the 
tobacco industry’s payment of a record-breaking amount of $250 billion to settle lawsuits 
launched by the states garnered substantial publicity and may have signaled to jurors that the 
companies were guilty of record breaking wrongful conduct.  Third, the settlement of the 
lawsuits in the billions gave jurors a new anchor value for damages in the billions rather than the 
millions.
31  Fourth, the Minnesota settlement provided for the public disclosure of the tobacco 
industry documents obtained during the discovery process, reducing litigation costs in future 
lawsuits. 
The states contracted out the tobacco cases on a contingency fee basis.  Because these 
deals were not put out for open competitive bids, there is a strong possibility that the process was 
used to reward political allies with excessively lucrative arrangements that were not in the public 
interest.  The attorneys representing Mississippi received 35% of the state’s settlement amount as 
their fee, or equal to $1.43 billion.
32  The attorney fee share of the Florida settlement amount was 
26%, leading to a payout of $3.43 billion.  The attorneys representing Texas in the litigation 
received 19% of the settlement amount, or $3.3 billion.  Attorney fees were $111 million for the 
state of Missouri and $265 million for Ohio.  Although no comprehensive tally of the amount of 
                                                 
31 Some observers have hypothesized that the subsequent large verdicts against other companies, such as GM, were 
also influenced by the anchoring effect of the MSA. 
32 The state-specific figures discussed here are from Viscusi (2002a), p. 51.  References are provided therein. 24 
 
the fees is available, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s partial tally in 2001 identified $11 billion 
in fees that had been received by attorneys.
33 
Until the MSA the tobacco industry had a record of never having paid out an individual 
smoker liability claim.  After the MSA the companies did not fare as well.  In individual cases 
and class actions resolved after the MSA, cigarette companies were not only found to be liable 
for compensatory damages but also were found liable for punitive damages, for which there are 
much more stringent legal criteria.  To justify an award of punitive damages, there must be an 
assessment that the defendant’s conduct displayed a reckless and callous disregard for the 
victim’s safety.   
Table 9 summarizes the results of the five largest punitive damages verdicts against the 
industry.  Three of the cases were individual smoker cases but nevertheless involved enormous 
verdicts, chiefly in the punitive damages component.  The level of punitive damages awarded is 
$150 million in Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc., $3 billion in Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., and $28 
billion in Bullock v. Philip Morris Inc.  The Florida cigarette class action Engle v. R.J. Reynolds 
had punitive damages of $145 billion, while the Illinois “light” cigarettes class action Price v. 
Philip Morris had punitive damages of $3.1 billion and compensatory damages of $7.1 billion.
34  
The Price case verdict had broad ramifications with respect to the market for securitizing the 
MSA payments, as it threatened the solvency of Philip Morris and its continued participation in 
the MSA payment system.  While these decisions were all appealed, the litigation landscape of 
the cigarette industry had undergone a dramatic shift.  Rather than putting an end to litigation 
                                                 
33 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “Chamber Targets Excessive Legal Fees: Files 21 FOIA Requests on Tobacco 
Settlements,” March 14, 2001. 
34 Although the Engle class action verdict was overturned, the findings in the case regarding the addictive properties 
of cigarettes and wrongful conduct can be used in the thousands of individual Engle progeny cases that may follow.  
To date, plaintiffs in the few Engle progeny cases that have been tried have had some successes in these individual 
cases.  25 
 
against the industry, the MSA increased it.
35  The protections against punitive damages and class 
actions that were part of the draft Proposed Resolution were not included in the MSA but would 
have proven to be valuable to the industry. 
 
7. Policy Ramifications 
7.1 Tax Policy Changes 
  The MSA also marked a pronounced shift in the treatment of the tobacco industry with 
respect to taxes and regulations.  Although the MSA imposed a tax equivalent fee that generated 
revenues for the states, states also imposed substantial additional excise taxes.  Table 10 
summarizes the excise tax trends from 1998 to 2008.
36  Only 5 states did not boost the excise tax 
amounts over that decade.  The absolute tax increase per pack is shown in the second to last 
column of Table 10, and the percentage tax increase shown in the final column.  New York has 
been a leader in terms of the magnitude of the tax increase, as it raised excise taxes by $2.19 per 
pack, or 391%.  Altogether there were 20 states that boosted the cigarette tax by $1.00 or more in 
addition to the MSA payments.  
  Raising cigarette taxes and cigarette prices will have the expected economic effects on 
demand.  The estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes range from -0.4 to -0.7.
37  
The average price per pack before the enactment of the MSA was $2.175 (Orzechowski and 
Walker 2001, p. 136).  At that time the total state and federal excise tax amount averaged $0.63 
per pack so that the MSA payments raised the tax equivalent penalty to about a dollar a pack.  
                                                 
35 Sloan, Trogdon, and Mathews (2005) used daily stock market return data to estimate the effect on stock prices and 
the cost of equity capital.  Unfavorable information reduced tobacco company returns.   
36 Trogdon and Sloan (2006) estimate that post-MSA cigarette taxes in 2002 were $0.10 higher. 
37 Viscusi (1992) reviews dozens of cigarette demand studies, and Hersch (2000) provides recent demand elasticity 
estimates.  26 
 
The MSA per pack cost raised cigarette prices by 18.4%, implying a 7-13% decrease in sales 
based on available demand elasticity estimates. 
  This range of effects is consistent with the overall estimated effect of the MSA, which 
includes the effect on prices and regulatory restrictions.  Sloan and Trogdon (2004) found that 
the MSA reduced smoking rates by 13% for the age 18-20 group and by 5% for older age 
groups.  
  The structure of cigarette taxes has also affected the mix of cigarette sales.  U.S. cigarette 
taxes are on a per pack basis rather than being proportional to the product price.  The higher 
cigarette taxes and MSA tax equivalents consequently have narrowed the relative price gap 
between the premium cigarettes and lower end cigarettes, which has been to the advantage of 
producers of premium cigarettes.
38  To the extent that cigarettes taxes have a health-related 
objective, the per pack tax approach is appropriate as there is no evidence indicating that the 
health risks of premium cigarettes are greater.  Indeed, the opposite may be the case, as many 
generic cigarettes have higher tar and nicotine ratings.   
  Higher cigarette taxes and the discrepancy of taxes across jurisdictions also create 
potential problems of border effects.  Consumers and possibly resellers of cigarettes may travel 
to purchase cigarettes if the price gap is sufficiently large.  A noteworthy instance of such a 
discrepancy is that created by the combined New York State and New York City tax of $4.25 per 
pack.  In addition to creating a price gap with respect to neighboring states, there is a price gap 
compared to cigarettes sold on Indian reservations, which by law are independent sovereign 
nations not subject to these taxes.  Because of the increased attractiveness of such cigarettes to 
smokers in New York City, the City of New York sought an injunction in 2009 to prevent the 
                                                 
38 “Tobacco Lights Up on Premium Blend,” Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2009, p. C10. 27 
 
sale of cigarettes by the Unkechauge Indian Nation.
39  Just as state legislators express surprise 
when cigarette tax revenues are less than those predicted by projections assuming completely 
inelastic demand, there is similar surprise and shock when consumers seek to make purchases 
that evade the tax after creating a situation of substantial price disparities.   
7.2 The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
  In many respects, the enactment of the 2009 legislation the Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act marked the culmination of the tax and regulatory effort that began with 
the attempt to settle the state lawsuits against the industry.  Various drafts of the Proposed 
Resolution, which Congress considered in 1997 and 1998, would have provided legal protections 
for the industry against major stakes lawsuits such as class actions and claims involving punitive 
damages.  While this 1997 proposal included tax components, it also included detailed regulatory 
provisions.  Among these provisions was a grant of authority to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) to regulate cigarettes.  The proposal also sought to bolster the on-product 
warnings requirements for cigarettes and to impose advertising restrictions, including bans on 
descriptors such as “low tar” and “light” unless the cigarette could be shown to be safer for 
health.  While the MSA included some advertising restrictions and a tax equivalent fee, these 
other components of the Proposed Resolution were not part of the MSA.  An agreement with the 
states could not, for example, grant FDA authority to regulate cigarettes.   
The combination of the MSA and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act achieved the anti-smoking objectives of the Proposed Resolution.  The 2009 law introduced 
a major increase in the degree of regulation of the cigarette industry.  With the support of user 
fees that are expected to raise the price of cigarettes by about $0.06 per pack, the Food and Drug 
Administration will be regulating the labeling and content of cigarettes.  Companies are not 
                                                 
39 See City of New York v. Golden Feather et al.: U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28 
 
permitted to use artificial flavors such as cloves, though menthol is still permitted.  Companies 
must submit the cigarette ingredients and nicotine information to the FDA for approval.  The Act 
also imposes new labeling requirements so that the current series of four rotating warnings will 
be replaced by nine rotating warnings that must comprise 50% of the front and rear panels of the 
pack.  The act also bans the use of descriptors such as “light” and “mild.” 
From the standpoint of efficient market operation, the FDA should foster a diversity of 
market choices with varying level risks, including lower risk cigarettes, coupled with information 
that enables consumers to have accurate assessments of the product risks.  Whether the FDA 
regulatory regime will encourage or discourage the introduction of lower risk cigarettes is yet to 
be determined.
40  
One component of the Act that has already faced a legal challenge is the series of 
restrictions on advertising.
41  The increased limitations on advertising may violate the First 
Amendment protections afforded to commercial speech.  A prominent rationale given in the Act 
for the restrictions on advertising was the FTC figure of $13 billion in cigarette advertising and 
marketing in 2005.  However, as shown above, most of these costs took the form of promotional 
discounts and price allowances.  Additional advertising and marketing restrictions may impede 
new entrants and the introduction of new products.   
 
 
                                                 
40 FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg made the following comments regarding the focus of the new FDA 
Center for Tobacco Products: “We need to study the composition of tobacco products and understand both the 
addictive components of tobacco and the toxic chemical additives.  We need to address how these substances are 
impacting health and ensure that there are not additional innovations by the tobacco industry that will put new 
products in the market that may be more addictive or more attractive to youth.”  “Margaret Hamburg Aims to 
Strengthen FDA Science,” Science. Vol. 325, August 14, 2009, p. 802.  
41 The motion for a preliminary injunction challenging provisions of the act was filed on August 31, 2009, in 
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. et al. v. United States of America et  al., U.S. District Court for the Western District of 




  The state lawsuits against the cigarette industry introduced a wide range of novel legal 
and policy issues.  If the states had prevailed, it would have been the first time that states were 
able to be reimbursed for financial externalities attributable to wrongful conduct that influenced 
consumption decisions.  Although no cases were tried to verdict, the MSA represented the largest 
civil case damages payment in U.S. history.  However, the settlement also took an unprecedented 
form, as it did not involve a lump sum payment or a structured settlement.  Rather, it took the 
form of a cigarette excise tax and regulatory restrictions, all of which were negotiated privately 
by representatives of industry and state attorneys general. 
The MSA served as a negotiated combination of tax equivalents and regulation that 
emerged from an out-of-court settlement that completely bypassed all traditional governmental 
inputs.  Taxes are not the province of attorney general discretion but require the approval of state 
legislatures or the U.S. Congress and must also be signed into law.  The enactment of new 
regulations likewise involves a detailed governmental and public review process.  For major 
regulations such as this, there must be a regulatory impact analysis, an opportunity for public 
comment, and internal administration review to ensure that the regulation is consistent with 
legislative requirements and societal interests.  All of these checks on taxes and regulations were 
bypassed by the MSA.  As a policy approach, negotiated tax and regulatory policies such as 
those resulting from the MSA are asymmetric, as they can only increase the tax and regulatory 
penalties but cannot decrease them.  
The stakes involved have proven to be enormous, and the structure of the MSA payments 
has established a commonality of financial interests between the tobacco industry and the states.  
Bypassing the usual legislative process, or in the case of regulations the usual rulemaking 30 
 
process, is not simply a breach of good government principles of civics books.  Bargains in 
which the key parties are the attorneys general and the cigarette industry may not be reflective of 
the kinds of taxes and regulations that are in society’s best interests.  Chief among the criticisms 
to date is that the MSA might have anti-competitive effects by imposing per pack financial 
penalties on new entrants that were not party to the litigation and by imposing limits on 
advertising and marketing, which would impede entry and the introduction of new products.  
Thus far, however, there is no firm evidence of significant adverse anti-competitive effects.  
Market shares have remained quite stable, as the MSA may have locked in market shares.  Any 
anti-competitive effects will be more evident over time.  
The other major critique of the MSA has been with respect to the allocation of the funds, 
as much less has gone to health care and anti-tobacco efforts than was anticipated.  As with tax 
revenues generally, states have treated these funds as fungible, so there has not been the 
substantial increase in the allocation of funds to health and tobacco programs that many expected 
to result from the MSA.  Whether such a targeting of funds should have been the appropriate 
policy objective is a different matter that involves comparison of the efficacy of such 
expenditures with other uses of the resources.  Even though the states reaped the funds windfall 
because of the tobacco litigation, the allocation that best advances the interests of the citizenry 
may not be closely tied to anti-tobacco initiatives.   31 
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Table 1 
Ratio of the State Settlement Payment Share to the State Medical Care Cost Share for States 
Participating in the Settlement
a 
 
State  Percentage Share 
of Medical Cost 
Percentage Share 
of Settlement 
Settlement Share Divided 
by Medical Cost Share 
Alabama 1.520  1.650  1.080 
Alaska 0.280  0.350  1.263 
Arizona 0.530  1.500  2.850 
Arkansas 1.020  0.840  0.828 
California 8.551  12.997  1.520 
Colorado 1.229  1.396  1.136 
Connecticut 1.948  1.890  0.970 
Delaware 0.513  0.403  0.784 
Georgia 3.154  2.499  0.792 
Hawaii 0.212  0.613  2.886 
Idaho 0.229  0.370 1.615 
Illinois 5.609  4.739  0.845 
Indiana 3.587  2.077  0.579 
Iowa 0.983  0.886 0.901 
Kansas 0.830  0.849  1.023 
Kentucky 2.806  1.793  0.639 
Louisiana 2.424  2.296  0.947 
Maine 0.724  0.783  1.082 
Maryland 2.048  2.302  1.124 
Massachusetts 3.170  4.113  1.297 
Michigan 3.326  4.431  1.332 
Missouri 2.722  2.316  0.851 
Montana 0.244  0.432  1.774 
Nebraska 0.569  0.606  1.065 
Nevada 0.521  0.621  1.191 
New Hampshire  0.894  0.678  0.759 
New Jersey  4.262  3.937  0.924 
New Mexico  0.351  0.607  1.729 
New York  15.170  12.995  0.857 
North Carolina  3.491  2.375  0.680 
North Dakota  0.211  0.373  1.764 
Ohio 6.148  5.129 0.834 35 
 
Oklahoma 1.199 1.055  0.880 
Oregon 1.003  1.169  1.165 
Pennsylvania 5.298  5.853  1.105 
Rhode Island  0.736  0.732  0.995 
South Carolina  1.422  1.198  0.842 
South Dakota  0.256  0.355  1.389 
Tennessee 2.874 2.485  0.865 
Utah 0.220  0.453 2.058 
Vermont 0.321  0.419  1.306 
Virginia 2.766  2.082  0.753 
Washington 1.498  2.091  1.396 
West Virginia  0.978  0.903  0.923 
Wisconsin 1.983 2.110  1.064 
Wyoming 0.178  0.253  1.420 
 
a Viscusi (2002a), Table 3.  Medical cost externality figures assume a 3% discount rate and 




Regression Estimates for Settlement Share  
and Relative Gain in Settlement 
 



















2 0.90  0.18 
 
a Relative gain in settlement = (settlement share – share of medical costs) / (share of medical 
costs).   
 
* Significant at 0.05 level, ** significant at 0.01 level, two-tailed test. 37 
 
Table 3 

























Alabama 19.10  109.22  0.57  61.16  0.32 
Alaska 6.92  23.07  0.33  40.24  0.58 
Arizona 17.93  99.61  0.56  216.94  1.21 
Arkansas 11.81  55.96  0.47 86.74  0.73 
California  195.55  862.59 0.44 1040.62 0.53 
Colorado 13.81  92.64  0.67 56.33  0.41 
Connecticut 18.24  125.47 0.69  251.98 1.38 
Delaware 5.04  26.73  0.53  35.22  0.70 
Florida 55.21  546.50  0.99  426.55  0.77 
Georgia 29.87  165.87  0.56  83.61  0.28 
Hawaii 6.81  40.67  0.60  70.59  1.04 
Idaho 5.49  24.55  0.45  25.06  0.46 
Illinois 44.42  314.54  0.71  653.70  1.47 
Indiana 24.55  137.85  0.56  343.66  1.40 
Iowa 12.97  58.77  0.45  89.89  0.69 
Kansas 10.40  56.34  0.54  119.41  1.15 
Kentucky 18.38  119.02  0.65 21.44  0.12 
Louisiana 19.44  152.42  0.78  117.93  0.61 
Maine 6.80  51.99  0.76  95.97  1.41 
Maryland 21.80  152.76  0.70  266.06  1.22 
Massachusetts 30.37  272.96  0.90  438.74  1.44 
Michigan 50.08  294.11  0.59  828.68  1.65 
Minnesota 25.60  152.91  0.60 171.13  0.67 
Mississippi 13.39  149.61  1.12  46.90  0.35 
Missouri 22.02  153.72  0.70  105.04  0.48 
Montana 4.61  28.71  0.62  16.74  0.36 
Nebraska 7.29  40.21  0.55  60.86  0.83 
Nevada 8.35  41.22  0.49  63.95  0.77 
New Hampshire  5.21  45.00  0.86  95.76  1.84 
New Jersey  46.08  261.33  0.57  612.09  1.33 
New Mexico  9.85  40.30  0.41  20.56  0.21 
New  York 118.27  862.46 0.73 1015.81 0.86 
North Carolina  30.04  157.62  0.52  40.31  0.13 
North Dakota  3.36  24.74  0.74  18.35  0.55 
Ohio 49.90  340.44  0.68  548.77  1.10 
Oklahoma 14.92  70.02  0.47  58.91  0.39 
Oregon 19.25  77.56  0.40  224.18  1.16 
Pennsylvania 49.46 388.37  0.79  887.86  1.80 38 
 
Rhode Island  5.86  48.58  0.83  94.00  1.60 
South Carolina  19.67  79.50  0.40  25.84  0.13 
South Dakota  3.00  23.58  0.79  21.67  0.72 
Tennessee 20.56  164.96  0.80  107.04  0.52 
Texas 82.62  449.99  0.54  490.72  0.59 
Utah 11.53  30.07  0.26  57.53  0.50 
Vermont 3.64  27.79  0.76  44.39  1.22 
Virginia 28.19  138.18  0.49  17.16  0.06 
Washington 29.66  138.76 0.47  337.78 1.14 
West Virginia  9.77  59.91  0.61  44.99  0.46 
Wisconsin 25.17  140.03  0.56 298.47  1.19 
Wyoming 3.40  16.78  0.49 6.85  0.20 
 
Sources:  Total revenue figures were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau website.  
(http://www.census.gov/govs/www/state03.html).  The MSA revenues by state for 2003 were 
obtained from McKinley et al. (2003).  The cigarette tax revenues were obtained from 





Total Amount of Securitized Proceeds Received by States, Fiscal Years 2000–2005 
 








New Jersey  2,751.8 
New York  4,200.0 
Oregon 657.6 
Rhode Island  545.9 
South Carolina  785.9 






Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office (2006), Table 3.  40 
 
Table 5 
Amount and Percentage of States’ Allocations of Master Settlement Agreement Payments and 
Securitized Proceeds by Category, Fiscal Years 2000–2005 
 
Category Dollars  (millions)  Percent 
Health $16,807  30.0 
Budget shortfalls  12,806  22.9 
Unallocated 6,639  11.9 
General purposes  3,955  7.1 
Infrastructure 3,350  6.0 
Education 3,078  5.5 
Debt service on securitized funds  3,005  5.4 
Tobacco control  1,943  3.5 
Economic development for tobacco regions  1,490  2.7 
Social services  961  1.7 
Reserves/rainy day funds  810  1.4 
Tax reductions  616  1.1 
Payments to tobacco growers  521  0.9 
Total $55,981  100.1 
 





Cigarette Advertising and Marketing, 1998 and 2005
a 
 
Expenditure Category  Expenditures (thousands of dollars) 
1998 2005 
Promotional allowances and 
price discounts 
3,449,404 10,623,755 
Retail value added  1,863,606  732,536 
Coupons 747,890  870,137 
Newspapers 35,279  1,589 
Magazines 337,038  44,777 
Outdoor 353,123  9,821 
Transit 48,116  0 
Point-of-sale 348,352  182,193 
Sampling distribution  17,297  17,211 
Specialty item distribution  426,347  230,534 
Public entertainment  297,786  214,227 
Direct mail  69,220  51,844 
Endorsements 0  0 
Internet 150  2,675 
Total 7,993,606  12,981,299 
 
a Expenditure categories included in the total but not reported in the table are sponsorships, 
endorsements, and telephone. All data converted to 2005$ using the CPI.  
 
Source: U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2007), Tables 2B and 2C. 42 
 
Table 7 
Cigarette Advertising and Marketing Regression
a 
 
Expenditure Category  Time Trend  Post-MSA 



























































a A constant is included in the regressions but is not reported.  Expenditure categories included in 
the total but not reported in the table are sponsorship, endorsements, and telephone.  All data 
converted to 2005$ using the CPI. 
 
**Statistically significant at 0.01 level, two tailed test.  
 
Source: Data used for the regressions are from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2007), 




Year-End Market Shares and HHI 
 
   1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Philip Morris  0.487 0.494 0.496 0.505 0.510 0.490 0.504 0.475 0.487
RJ Reynolds  0.242 0.240 0.230 0.230 0.223 0.231 0.215 0.288 0.282
Brown & Williamson  0.160 0.150 0.134 0.117 0.109 0.112 0.105 .  . 
Lorillard  0.087 0.091 0.104 0.096 0.093 0.091 0.093 0.088 0.092
Commonwealth Brands  . .  0.011 0.018 0.022 0.030  0.031 0.029 0.035
Liggett  0.013 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.022
Others  0.010 0.012 0.023 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.025 0.097 0.082
HHI  Index  3291.71 3327.30 3284.82 3317.40 3317.68 3162.91 3221.77 3270.92 3335.90
 
The data on year-end market shares are obtained from the Maxwell Consumer Reports issued in March 1999, March 2000, March 
2001, February 2002, March 2003, February 2004, and February 2006. The year-end market shares are reported in each Maxwell 

















Largest Cigarette Punitive Damages Verdicts 
 
Case Name 
Award ($ millions) 
Current Status  Compensatory 
Damages 
Punitive 
Damages  Total 
Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc.  
(2001)  5.54 3,000.0  3,005.54  Punitive damages reduced to 
$50 million on appeal.
a  
Bullock v. Philip Morris Inc.  
(2002)  0.65 28,000.0  28,000.65 
New trial ordered on the issue 
of punitive damages,
b led to 
$13.8 million punitive 
damages award.
c  
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds  
Tobacco Co. (2000)  12.7 145,000.0  145,012.7 
Reversed; the class was 
decertified and individuals 
claims are being filed. 
Price v. Philip Morris Inc.  
(2003)  7,100.0 3,100.0  10,200.0  Reversed by Illinois Supreme 
Court. 
Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc.  
(2002) 
0.17 150.0  150.17 
Punitive damages vacated and 




a Source: Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 Cal.App.4th 1640 (2005). 
b Source: Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 4th 655 (2008). 
c Source: “Jury Awards $13.8 Million in Cigarette Suit,” New York Times, August 24, 2009. 45 
 
Table 10 


















Alabama 0.165  0.425  0.260  157.6 
Alaska 1.000  2.000  1.000  100.0 
Arizona 0.580  2.000  1.420  244.8 
Arkansas 0.315  0.590  0.275  87.3 
California 0.370  0.870  0.500  135.1 
Colorado 0.200  0.840  0.640  320.0 
Connecticut 0.500  2.000  1.500  300.0 
Delaware 0.240  1.150  0.910  379.2 
District of Columbia  0.650  1.000  0.350  53.8 
Florida 0.339  0.339  0  0 
Georgia 0.120  0.370  0.250  208.3 
Hawaii 0.800  1.800  1.000    125.0 
Idaho 0.280  0.570  0.290  103.6 
Illinois 0.580  0.980  0.400  69.0 
Indiana 0.155  0.995  0.840  541.9 
Iowa 0.360  1.360  1.000  277.8 
Kansas 0.240  0.790  0.550  229.2 
Kentucky 0.030  0.300  0.270  900.0 
Louisiana 0.200  0.360  0.160  80.0 
Maine 0.740  2.000  1.260  170.3 
Maryland 0.360  2.000  1.640  455.6 
Massachusetts 0.760  1.510  0.750  98.7 
Michigan 0.750  2.000  1.250  166.7 
Minnesota 0.480  1.493  1.013  211.0 
Mississippi 0.180  0.180  0  0 
Missouri 0.170  0.170  0  0 
Montana 0.180  1.700  1.520  844.4 
Nebraska 0.340  0.640  0.300  88.2 
Nevada 0.350  0.800  0.450  128.6 
New Hampshire  0.370  1.080  0.710  191.9 
New Jersey  0.800  2.575  1.775  221.9 
New Mexico  0.210  0.910  0.700  333.3 
New York  0.560  2.750  2.190  391.1 
North Carolina  0.050  0.350  0.300  600.0 
North Dakota  0.440  0.440  0  0 
Ohio 0.240  1.250  1.010  420.8 
Oklahoma 0.230  1.030  0.800  347.8 
Oregon 0.680  1.180  0.500  73.5 
Pennsylvania 0.310  1.350  1.040 335.5 46 
 
Rhode Island  0.710  2.460  1.750  246.5 
South Carolina  0.070  0.070  0  0 
South Dakota  0.330  1.530  1.200  363.6 
Tennessee 0.130  0.620  0.490  376.9 
Texas 0.410  1.410  1.000  243.9 
Utah 0.515  0.695  0.180  35.0 
Vermont 0.440  1.790  1.350  306.8 
Virginia 0.025  0.300  0.275  1100.0 
Washington 0.825  2.025  1.200  145.5 
West Virginia  0.170  0.550  0.380  223.5 
Wisconsin 0.590  1.770  1.180  200.0 
Wyoming 0.120  0.600  0.480  400.0 
 
Source: Orzechowski and Walker (2008, pp. 275-326).  
 